ABSTRACT The pilot spoofing attack is considered as an active eavesdropping activity launched by an adversary during the reverse channel training phase. By transmitting the same pilot signal as the legitimate user, the pilot spoofing attack is able to degrade the quality of legitimate transmission and, more severely, facilitate eavesdropping. In an effort to detect the pilot spoofing attack and minimize its damages, in this paper we propose a novel random-training-assisted (RTA) pilot spoofing detection algorithm. In particular, we develop a new training mechanism by adding a random training phase after the conventional pilot training phase. By examining the difference of the estimated legitimate channels during these two phases, the pilot spoofing attack can be detected accurately. If no spoofing attack is detected, we also present a computationally efficient channel estimation enhancement algorithm to further improve the channel estimation accuracy. For the case of the missed detection of the spoofing attack, we also propose a secure transmission algorithm for downlink data transmission to enhance the security. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed RTA scheme can achieve efficient pilot spoofing detection in all cases and its performance is superior to other state-of-the-art detectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, wireless channel is ubiquitously accessible to both legitimate and illegitimate users, and therefore vulnerable to security attacks [1] . An eavesdropper within the coverage area of the legitimate transmitter can intercept the transmitted secure information while staying undetected. In order to maintain confidential transmission, conventional cryptographic (encryption) techniques were adopted in wireless communications aiming at disrupting the readability of the information. In recent years, physical layer security is emerging as an alternative approach to prevent eavesdropping by exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless channels.
Pioneer efforts on physical layer security were made by Shannon [2] , Wyner [3] , Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [4] from information-theoretic perspective. Based on these works, intensive studies were devoted to the development of various physical layer security techniques against eavesdropping, such as artificial-noise-aided security techniques [5] - [8] , secure transmission over wiretap channel with finite alphabet inputs [9] , [10] , diversity-based security approaches [11] , [12] , physical-layer secret key generation methods [13] , [14] , and security-oriented beamforming techniques [15] - [21] . While these physical layer security research works are focusing on protecting the confidential information against passive eavesdropping, recently researchers start to pay attention on active eavesdroppers which can cause more severe threats [22] - [25] . Particularly, pilot spoofing attack launched by an active eavesdropper has drawn significant attention since this type of attack can degrade the quality of the legitimate transmission and, more vitally, facilitate eavesdropping [26] - [33] .
In [26] , Zhou et al. investigated the pilot spoofing attack for the first time and analyzed its severe consequences. The pilot spoofing attack targets at the reverse channel training procedure in the time-division duplex (TDD) multi-input single-output (MISO) system, where a pilot-assisted channel estimation approach is widely adopted. Since the pilot sequences are publicly known in general with a given protocol or standard, an active eavesdropper can send the same pilot sequence as the legitimate receiver in the reverse channel training phase. As a result, the channel estimation at the legitimate transmitter is biased and contains the components of illegitimate channel. If the legitimate transmitter designed the beamformer based on this biased channel estimation and used this beamformer for the downlink data transmission, then the transmitted data signals would turn away from the legitimate receiver and towards the direction of the eavesdropper. Therefore, the pilot spoofing attack leads to performance degradation of legitimate transmission and, more severely, information leakage to the eavesdropper.
Being aware of the serious consequences of the pilot spoofing attack, it is of significant importance and urgency for the legitimate users to detect this type of attack and take actions to protect the confidentiality of wireless communications in a practical manner [27] - [34] . In [27] , Kapetanović et al. proposed to use modified phase-shift keying (PSK) symbols as pilots in two training slots for channel estimation. The pilot spoofing attack can be detected by examining the phase difference of randomly chosen PSK signals in two time slots. However, in addition to the needs of re-designing the pilot signals and the channel estimation process, the detection performance of this method is not very satisfactory. In [28] , Xiong et al. proposed an energy ratio detector which explores the power difference between the channel estimations obtained at the transmitter by uplink training and at the receiver by downlink training. Yet, the training procedure with both uplink and downlink makes this approach more complex in practical implementation. Considering this problem, a novel approach was proposed in [29] based solely on uplink training. The main idea of this approach is to self-contaminate the pilot and use the information-theoretic minimum description length (MDL) algorithm to detect the spoofing attack. In [30] , this MDL-based approach has been extended to the scenario with legitimate users and multiple eavesdroppers. Unfortunately, the fore-mentioned schemes can only detect the existence of the spoofing attack but is not capable of eliminating the serious consequences in the data transmission phase. To this end, in [31] a two-way training detector was proposed to not only detect the spoofing attack but also avoid the information leakage by a secure transmission scheme. Nevertheless, this two-way approach still requires additional downlink training which makes the protocol more complicated. Moreover, the number of pilot signals in the downlink training session is proportional to the number of the transmit antennas, which will reduce the efficiency of the system. In [32] , the authors introduced a secret key agreement protocol for a multi-user system which is under the pilot contamination attack by non-colluding eavesdroppers. Its basic idea is to utilize the crucial complementary relation between the received signal strengths at the eavesdropper and the legitimate user. In [33] , a novel algorithm was introduced to counter the training phase jamming for a single-cell downlink massive MIMO system. It uses a secret key to expand the cardinality of the set of pilot signals and keep the pilot sequence assignments hidden from the adversary.
Inspired by these studies, in this paper we propose a novel pilot spoofing detector based solely on uplink training with the assist of random training signals. Particularly, we develop a new training mechanism by adding a random training phase after the conventional pilot training phase. In the channel estimation procedure, the legitimate user transmits two sets of training signals sequentially, i.e. the pre-designed pilot signal during the pilot phase and then the random signal during the random phase. The legitimate channel is estimated by the conventional non-blind channel estimation method during the pilot phase and the blind channel estimation approach during the random phase, respectively. By examining the difference of the legitimate channel estimations during these two phases, a novel random-training-assisted (RTA) detection algorithm is proposed to identify the existence of the pilot spoofing attack. If the spoofing detector indicates the presence of pilot spoofing attack, Alice should immediately terminate the transmission to avoid the information leakage to Eve. If no spoofing attack is detected, we present a computationally efficient channel estimation enhancement algorithm to further improve the channel estimation accuracy and increase the transmission rate. For the case that the detector fails to detect the spoofing attack, we also propose a secure transmission algorithm to protect the information from eavesdropping.
The main contributions of our work are summarized in the following five aspects:
• We present a novel random-training-assisted (RTA) spoofing detection algorithm. Unlike the previous works which require additional downlink and feedback mechanism or complicated pilot design and channel estimation algorithm, our proposed spoofing detection scheme is based solely on uplink training and does not require significant changes on neither the design of the pilot signals nor the procedure of the channel estimation.
• We derive the closed-form expression of the test statistic's probability density function (PDF) and provide theoretical performance analysis of the proposed spoofing detector.
• For no spoofing attack case, a simple channel estimation enhancement algorithm is presented in order to improve the accuracy of the channel estimation. Unlike the previous works which introduce overhead for the spoofing detection (e.g. addition downlink channel estimation), our proposed scheme can efficiently utilize the random signal to enhance the accuracy of channel estimation and reduce the overhead.
• In case that the RTA detector fails to detect the spoofing attack and has missed detection, a secure transmission algorithm is proposed in order to protect the information from eavesdropping during the downlink data transmission.
• Extensive simulation results demonstrate that our proposed RTA algorithm can achieve efficient pilot spoofing detection as well as accurate channel estimation.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the signal model and illustrate the serious consequences caused by the pilot spoofing attack. In Section III, we develop our RTA spoofing detector elaborately and then provide the theoretic performance analysis of it. After introducing a channel estimation enhancement algorithm and secure transmission algorithm in Section IV, we give extensive simulation studies in section V to illustrate the efficiency of our proposed RTA spoofing detector. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
The following notation is used throughout this paper. Boldface lower-case letters indicate column vectors and boldface upper-case letters indicate matrices; C denotes the set of all complex numbers; (·) T and (·) H denote the transpose and transpose-conjugate operation, respectively; I L is the L × L identity matrix; Re{·} denotes the real part of a complex number; sgn{·} denotes zero-threshold quantization; E{·} represents statistical expectation. Finally, | · | and · are the scalar magnitude and vector norm, respectively. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a typical MISO wiretap system, in which the legitimate transmitter Alice is equipped with M (M ≥ 2) antennas and both the legitimate receiver Bob and the eavesdropper Eve are equipped with single antenna, as shown in Fig. 1 . The legitimate transmission adopts uplink (Bob-to-Alice) pilot training and downlink (Alice-to-Bob) data transmission scheme. In other words, Bob first sends pilot signals to Alice during the pilot training phase, then Alice estimates the channel and transmits data to Bob during the data transmission phase.
The legitimate Bob-to-Alice channel h B ∈ C M ×1 and the illegitimate Eve-to-Alice channel h E ∈ C M ×1 are modeled as
respectively. Let α B and α E represent the large scale (long-term) fading components (e.g. shadowing and path-loss) for the legitimate and illegitimate channels, respectively. h B , h E ∈ C M ×1 denote the small scale (short-term) fading coefficients (e.g. multi-path effect), and each element of h B , h E is circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) distributed with zero-mean and unit-variance. Under the condition of a TDD system, h B and h E are both reciprocal for the uplink and downlink channels. Moreover, h B and h E are independent from each other. For the consideration of improving the performance of the legitimate transmission, Alice adopts beamforming approach to transmit signals in the direction that yields the best quality. In order to design the beamformer, it is essential for Alice to acquire the correct knowledge of h B during the reverse (uplink) training phase, in which Bob sends the pre-designed pilot signals to Alice. This procedure makes the legitimate transmission under dangerous threat due to the pilot spoofing attack in which Eve sends the same pilot signals.
In the following, we will first investigate the case in which Eve does not launch the pilot spoofing attack and build the basic signal model of channel estimation and beamforming at Alice. Then we will describe the scenario where Eve launches the pilot spoofing attack, illustrate the serious consequences of it and attach urgent importance to the detection of such attack.
A. CHANNEL ESTIMATION AND BEAMFORMING WITHOUT SPOOFING
For the purpose of acquiring the channel state information (CSI), Bob sends the pilot signals b(n), n = 1, . . . , N , with power P B , N is the total number of pilot signals. The received signal at Alice in the nth time slot is
where z(n) is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero-mean and variance σ 2 A . We can rewrite (3) in the matrix form as
where
Knowing the pilot signals b, Alice can easily estimate the channel h B by the least-squares approach [35] 
Then, Alice utilizes h B to design the beamformer w for the downlink data transmission
which can provide Bob with maximum receive SNR. With this beamformer, the received signal at Bob in the nth time slot is
where P A is the data transmission power of Alice, s(n) is the transmitted data, E{|s(n)| 2 } = 1 and v(n) is AWGN at Bob with zero-mean and variance σ 2 B .
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Here we use the average SNR at Bob to evaluate the performance of legitimate transmission
whose proof is offered in the Appendix. By using a beamformer w based on the estimated channel h B , the performance of data transmission can be improved dramatically.
B. IMPACT OF PILOT SPOOFING ATTACK
Aiming to protect the transmission between Alice and Bob, we assume for Alice and Bob that Eve has perfect pilot synchronization as Bob. Under this assumption, if Eve conducts the pilot spoofing attack by sending the same pilot signals at the same time, the received signal at Alice will become
After rewriting it in the matrix form
the estimated channel h B becomes
In general, h E and h B are not in the same direction, i.e. h E = αh B (α = 0). The channel estimation (11) not only contains the legitimate channel h B , but also has the components of the eavesdropping channel h E . If Alice still uses this contaminated/spoofed h B to design the beamformer as in (6) , the direction of the signals transmitted by Alice will turn towards the direction of Eve. Specifically, during the data transmission phase, Eve remains silent but attempts to overhear the information transmitted from Alice to Bob. When Bob is under the spoofing attack, according to the received signal at Bob in (7), the average SNR at Bob has the expression as
whose proof is offered in the Appendix. Similarly, the received signal at Eve in the nth time slot is
where v (n) is AWGN at Eve with zero-mean and variance σ 2 E . The average SNR at Eve has the expression as
whose proof can be found in the Appendix. An obvious conclusion is that with spoofing power P E increasing, SNR B will decrease while SNR E will increase. In other words, by launching the spoofing attack, Eve can manipulate the channel estimation result and benefit from degrading legitimate transmission performance as well as enhancing eavesdropping.
To illustrate the impact due to the pilot spoofing attack, we carry out a simulation study as shown in Fig. 2 . In this simulation, we set It can be observed from Fig. 2 that the theoretical results (the solid lines) perfectly match the simulation results (the dashed lines) and only solid lines appeal. When P E increases, SNR B decreases and the performance of the legitimate transmission is degraded. Most importantly, SNR E becomes larger as P E increasing, which implies that Eve can successfully spoof Alice and eavesdrop the transmitted information.
While the consequence of pilot spoofing attack is unbearable, it is of great importance that Alice and Bob identify this type of attack and then take actions if the spoofing attack is detected. In the following section, we will present our RTA pilot spoofing detection scheme and provide the theoretical performance analysis of it. 
III. RANDOM-TRAINING-ASSISTED PILOT SPOOFING DETECTION
Considering the serious impact due to the pilot spoofing attack discussed in the previous section, in this section we will develop a novel pilot spoofing detector which is based solely on uplink training with the assist of random training. In particular, we develop a new training mechanism by adding a Random Phase following the conventional Pilot Phase. For the uplink channel estimation, Bob first transmits N p pre-designed pilot bits during the Pilot Phase, then sends N r random bits during the Random Phase, as illustrated in Fig. 3 . While the pilot bits are publicly known to Alice, Bob, and Eve, the random bits are randomly generated by Bob and unknown to neither Alice nor Eve. In the following, we will introduce our proposed spoofing detection algorithm in detail for Pilot Phase and Random Phase, respectively. For the convenience of developing our scheme, we define two hypothesises: H 0 denotes that there is no pilot spoofing attack; H 1 denotes that Alice and Bob are under pilot spoofing attack.
A. PILOT PHASE
During the pilot phase, Bob transmits N p pilot bits, b p (n) ∈ {±1}, n = 1, . . . , N p , and Eve may transmit the same pilot bit sequence as Bob since the pilot bit sequence is publicly known.
Under the hypothesis of H 0 , the received signal at Alice in the nth time slot is
where the AWGN u p (n) ∼ CN (0, σ 2 A I M ). Rewrite it in the matrix form
where h
U p b p is the estimation error and by central limited theorem
Under the hypothesis of H 1 , the received signal at Alice in the nth time slot is
Similarly, we can rewrite it in the matrix form (20) and the channel estimation result under H 1 is
Comparing to (17), we can observe that the channel estimation (21) under H 1 is biased and turn towards h E due to the attack launched by Eve.
B. RANDOM PHASE
During the random phase, Bob transmits N r random bits b r (n) ∈ {±1} which are unknown to neither Alice nor Eve. Therefore, the strategies for Eve are either to keep silence to reduce the chance of exposure or to transmit the same interference signals (e.g. different random bits or Gaussian noise) to disrupt the channel estimation at Alice. Then, we attempt to detect spoofing attack by exploiting the difference of Bob's and Eve's pilot signals during the random phase. For the convenience of the algorithm development and a more straight forward understanding for the algorithm, we first assume a simple transmission model where Eve remains silent during the random phase. We will discuss the case where Eve also attacks during the random phase in Section III-D. Under this assumption, the received signal at Alice in the nth time slot is
Rewrite it in the matrix form
Without knowing the random bits b r , we propose for Alice to adopt the iterative least-squares (ILS) algorithm [36] , [37] to blindly estimate h B . The ILS algorithm is a blind joint detection algorithm which can accurately and effectively detect the transmitted symbols and estimate the CSI at the same time. The basic idea of the ILS algorithm is to iteratively execute the symbol detection and the channel estimation until convergence. In order to obtain a reliable solution, we use the estimated channel h Bp acquired by the pilot bits as the initialization of the ILS algorithm. Due to the space limitation, we would not review the ILS algorithm in detail but simply summarize it in Algorithm 1. Superscript d denotes iteration index.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Least-Squares (ILS) Algorithm
If the channel estimation result h Br acquired in the random phase using ILS algorithm is accurate, then for both H 0 and H 1 , the channel estimation will be h Br = 1 N r Y r b r and we have
U r b r is the estimation error and
While the channel estimation h Br for the random phase is reliable under both H 0 and H 1 , we recall that h Bp for the pilot phase is reliable under H 0 but biased under H 1 . In the following, we will develop our spoofing attack detection algorithm by examining the difference of the estimated legitimate channels during these two phases.
C. PILOT SPOOFING DETECTOR AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
After evaluating the channel estimation during both pilot and random phases, our proposed pilot spoofing detector is straightforward. According to (17) , (21) and (25) , the difference between h Bp and h Br under H 0 and H 1 has the expression as
Notice that under H 0 the difference contains just the noise terms and has relatively small value, while under H 1 it has illegitimate channel component √ P E h E and is more significant. Based on this fact, we introduce the test statistic as
to differentiate H 0 and H 1 , and to implement the spoofing attack detection. The hypothesis test problem of the detector is
where γ is the test threshold. Now we attempt to provide the theoretical performance analysis of the proposed spoofing detector in (30) and determine appropriate test threshold γ . According to (18) , (22) and (26), we have the distribution of ( h
Therefore, under H 0 , the distribution of T = h
where χ 2 2M denotes the chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom 2M .
Similarly, under H 1 , the distribution of T = h
Given a threshold γ , we can derive the probability of false alarm P fa as
where f (t) and F(t) are the probability density function (PDF) and corresponding cumulative distribution function (CDF) of χ 2 2M , respectively. Similarly, with the threshold γ , the probability of detection P d of our proposed detector is
Given a P fa (or P d ), the corresponding threshold γ can be obtained by calculating the inverse function of F(
D. EVE ATTACKS DURING RANDOM PHASE
In this case, Bob transmits N r random bits b r (n) and Eve transmits N r different random signal b Er (n) at the same time during the random phase. The received signal at Alice in the nth time slot is
Again, we rewrite it in the matrix form as
Due to this attack, the legitimate channel estimation and the random bit detection returned by the ILS algorithm may be not accurate. Specifically, let b r be the detected random bit vector returned by ILS. Then, the channel estimation result h Br for H 1 can be expressed as
where µ Then, we can rewrite the difference between h Bp and h Br under H 0 and H 1 as
While the difference contains just the noise terms and has relatively small value under H 0 , we notice that under H 1 it has also the channel components (1−µ)
The performance of the proposed detector depends on µ and ν, i.e. the detected random bit vector b r returned by the ILS algorithm. Unfortunately, when the received signal contains two signals √ P B h B b r (n) and In order to analyze the performance of our detector under this case, we have the distribution of ( h
While the distribution of test statistic T under H 0 remains the same, under H 1 the distribution of T = h
Compare (48) with (38), we notice that the (48) can influence the performance of the spoofing detector under the case that Eve also attack during random phase. Given a probability of false alarm (i.e. a threshold), a smaller value of 2 + P E α E (1 − ν) 2 results in a less probability of correct detection and worse performance. Unfortunately, due to the lack of theoretic analysis on the b r returned by the ILS algorithms, the exact value of µ and ν are unknown. Therefore, we attempt to find the minimum value of P B α B (1 − µ) 2 + P E α E (1 − ν) 2
FIGURE 4. The minimum values of (P
with constraint µ 2 + ν 2 = 1. The finding is offered in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1: The minimum value of P B α B (1 − µ) 2 + P E α E (1 − ν) 2 with the constraint µ 2 + ν 2 = 1 is approximately equal to P B α B (1 − µ * ) 2 + P E α E (1 − ν * ) 2 , where
To verify the Proposition 1, we carry out an experiment in Fig. 4 to illustrate the accuracy of the approximated minimum value obtained by Proposition 1. Therefore, we conclude that, with a sufficient number of random bits, the probability of detection P d of our proposed detector under Eve attacking during random phase case has performance lower bound as
where F(t) is the CDF of χ 2 2M , γ is the threshold,
). The simulation studies in Section V demonstrates the robustness of our proposed spoofing detector to Eve's attack during the random phase and verifies the above discussion.
IV. COUNTERMEASURE STRATEGIES AFTER SPOOFING DETECTION A. CHANNEL ESTIMATION ENHANCEMENT
If the spoofing detector indicates the presence of pilot spoofing attack, Alice should immediately terminate the transmission to avoid the information leakage to Eve. If the spoofing detector indicates absence of any spoofing attack, the channel estimations h Bp and h Br are both reliable for Alice to design the beamformer. However, it is well known that larger number of pilot bits can provide more accurate channel estimation. If we have the knowledge of the random bits and use them together with the pilot bits to estimate the channel, the accuracy will be further improved. Motivated by this fact,
Algorithm 2 ILS-Based Channel Estimation Enhancement
in this section we introduce a computationally efficient channel estimation enhancement algorithm to efficiently utilize the random signal to enhance the accuracy of channel estimation and reduce the system overhead.
We first use h Bp obtained by the pilot bits to detect the random bits
After combining the pilot and random bits as 
To further improve the accuracy, we iteratively execute the random bits detection (50) and the channel estimation (51) until convergence. The proposed ILS-based channel estimation enhancement algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2. Experimentally, the number of executed iteration is 2 ∼ 4 in general. The simulation results show that this simple channel estimation enhancement can significantly improve the performance comparing with using only N p pilot bits and can approach the performance benchmark which uses (N p + N r ) pilot bits.
B. SECURITY ENHANCEMENT FOR DOWNLINK TRANSMISSION
When the absence of pilot spoofing attack is identified by the RTA spoofing detector, channel estimation enhancement algorithm developed in last subsection can improve the efficiency of the downlink transmission. However, there is still a potential security threat that the detector may fail to identify the spoofing attack, i.e. the missed detection of the active eavesdropper. Under this situation, security efforts should be taken to avoid potential information leak. Fig. 9 illustrates the probability of correct detection versus the spoofing power P E , where the performances of three strategies of Eve in random phase are included. First of all, the simulation results illustrate that the RTA spoofing detector can successfully detect spoofing attack even when Eve attacks in the random phase. This result demonstrates robustness of the RTA spoofing detector. Moreover, we also observe that the missed detection only occurs when the spoofing power P E is very low. Therefore, in order to further enhance the security, we introduce a simple secure transmission approach for Alice in case of the missed detection of the spoofing attack due to low spoofing power P E .
With the presence of pilot spoofing attack during both pilot phase and random phase, the channel estimation result during random phase has a form of (43). When Eve uses relatively low spoofing power P E , the ILS algorithm will return the estimation of the detected random bits b r with high probability of correctness, thus µ = (43) with very high probability. Therefore, we have
where n
U r b r is the AWGN term. Thus, (52) implies that the (energy-included) eavesdropping channel can be estimated by
which can be utilized in designing downlink data transmission beamformer w and achieving the secure transmission in the physical layer security concept. The optimal beamforming design w in the context of physical layer security is to maximize the secrecy rate R s (w)
where φ P A /σ 2 B and ψ P A /σ 2 E . The maximal secrecy rate can be achieved by selecting the beamformer along the direction of the generalized eigenvector of the matrix pencil (I + φh B h H B , I + ψh E h H E ) corresponding to the largest generalized eigenvalue [16] . However, we should be aware that such optimal design requires the knowledge of h E , P E and σ 2 E which are in general not always available for Alice. 1 Considering this hurdle in the realistic applications, we turn to seek a suboptimal but practical secure transmission solution.
In high SNR regime, the optimal direction approach is zero-forcing (ZF) [16] , i.e. h E ⊥w. Therefore, for the practical purpose, we attempt to design beamformer w in a ZF manner, i.e. maximizing the γ B = P A h H B w 2 /σ 2 B while forcing the γ E = P A h H E w 2 /σ 2 E down to zero. This optimization problem can be formulated as
(58) 1 We recall (53) that the estimated illegitimate channel h E contains components of both unknown power P E and unknown channel h E . We cannot easily obtain them by decomposing h E .
The optimal solution of the optimization problem (56)-(58) can be easily obtained as
Notice that the secure beamforming design in (59) only requires h Bc and h E which can be easily obtained as (51) and (53) and therefore is very practical. The simulation results in the next section illustrate that our proposed ZF-based secure beamforming can significantly improve the secrecy rate and achieve performance as good as the generalized eigen-decomposition-based secure beamforming approach.
V. SIMULATION STUDIES
In this section, extensive simulations are carried out to illustrate the accuracy of our proposed spoofing detector as well as verify our theoretical performance analysis. We will demonstrate the spoofing detection performance for various numbers of pilots, power budgets used by Eve, numbers of antennas used by Alice. In all simulations, the small scale fading vectors of the legitimate and illegitimate channels, h B and h E , are modeled to be Rayleigh fading with the channel vectors comprising i.i.d. samples of a complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit variance. The large scale fading coefficients are set as α B = α E = 1. The AWGN powers at Alice, Bob, and Eve are fixed at σ 2 A = σ 2 B = σ 2 E = 1. In all simulations, our proposed algorithm uses the same number of pilot bits and random bits, i.e. N p = N r . The simulation results are derived from 10 6 channel realizations. We will first focus on demonstrating the performance of our proposed algorithm itself, and then compare it with other state-of-the-art spoofing detectors to illustrate the advantage of our proposed algorithm. In Fig. 5 we conduct the simulation to illustrate the performance of our detector as a function of spoofing power 27392 VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 6. ROC curves of proposed spoofing detector (training power P B = 10, spoofing power P E = 1, and number of Alice's antennas M = 4, Eve transmits nothing during the random phase).
P E ranging from −10dB to 20dB. We set the number of Alice's antennas as M = 4, the pilot power P B = 5, the number of pilot (random) bits as N p = N r = 16, 32 and 64, and the probability of false alarm as P fa = 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001, respectively. From Fig. 5 , we can conclude that more power Eve spends on the pilot spoofing attack leads to higher probability of correct spoofing detection. More importantly, even under very weak spoofing signal, for example P E = −5dB, the performance of our proposed spoofing detector is still higher than 98% accuracy with sufficient number of pilot N p = 64.
In Fig. 6 , we plot the ''receiver operating characteristic'' (ROC) curves that show the probability of correct spoofing detection P d versus the probability of false alarm P fa . In this simulation, we fix the number of Alice's antennas as M = 4, the training power of Bob as P B = 10, and the spoofing power of Eve as P E = 1. Three ROC curves of the proposed algorithm are shown with different number of pilot bits (and random bits), N p = N r = 16, 32, and 64. The theoretical performances obtained by (39) and (40) are also included to verify our theoretical analysis. From Fig. 6 we can conclude that our proposed detector is able to accurately identify the pilot spoofing attack. Particularly, with sufficient pilot bits N p = 64, our proposed spoofing detection can achieve higher than 99.9% accuracy with the false alarm rate at P fa = 0.001. The simulation results also perfectly match the theoretical performance analysis derived in (39) and (40). Moreover, as we predicted, the larger number of pilot bits can dramatically improve detection performance.
In order to illustrate the influence of the number of pilot bits (and random bits), in Fig. 7 we carry out a similar simulation to show the probability of correct detection of our proposed algorithm versus the number of pilot bits N p (number of random bits N r ). In this simulation, the power of pilot and random signals is P B = 5, spoofing power is P E = 1, the number of Alice's antennas is M = 4. Larger number of pilot bits can provide more accurate channel estimation and spoofing detection, but will result in larger overhead. Therefore, an efficient pilot spoofing detection scheme should have both accurate spoofing detection and channel estimation with small number of pilot bits. The results illustrate that our proposed detector is very efficient and requires relatively small number of pilot and random bits, for example N p = N r = 30, to accurately detect the pilot spoofing attack.
Next, in Fig. 8 we show the probability of correct detection P d as a function of the number of Alice's antennas M . Clearly, larger number of antennas, which can provide more spatial degrees of freedom and signal processing power, results in more accurate spoofing detection performance but higher hardware cost and complexity. With the moderate number VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 9. Probability of correct detection P d versus the spoofing power P E (training power P B = 5, number of Alice's antennas M = 4, and false alarm rate P fa = 0.001). During the random phase, Eve sends i) nothing, ii) random bits, and iii) random Gaussian noise. FIGURE 10. ROC curves of our proposed spoofing detector (training power P B = 5, spoofing power P E = 1, and number of Alice's antennas M = 4). During the random phase, Eve sends i) nothing, ii) random bits, and iii) random Gaussian noise.
of antennas, for example M = 8, our proposed detector can achieve very satisfactory spoofing detection performance. While all the above simulation studies assume that Eve would not send any signal during the random phase, next we illustrate the robustness of our proposed spoofing detector when Eve also attack during the random phase and verify the discussion in Section III-D. In Fig. 9 we repeat the similar simulation as Fig. 5 , but also consider the cases that Eve sends random bits or random Gaussian noise during the random phase. It can be observed from Fig. 9 that our proposed spoofing detection algorithm has very similar performance when Eve attacks during the random phase with different attack powers. In Fig. 10 we fix the attack power at P E = 1 and repeat the similar simulation as Fig. 6 . While there is a little performance degradation for small number of pilot (N = 16), our proposed spoofing detector still has the same performance when the number of pilot is sufficient (N = 64). To further illustrate the impact of sending random bits by Eve during the random phase, in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 we consider both cases that Eve sends nothing and Eve sends random bits during the random phase. The probabilities of correct detection P d versus the number of the pilot (random) bits and the number of Alice's antennas are illustrated in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 , respectively. According to the simulation results from Figs. 9-12, we can conclude that our proposed spoofing detector is robust to Eve's attack during the random phase.
In Fig. 13 , we repeat the similar simulation as Fig. 5 and include several other state-of-the-art detectors for the comparison purposes: i) Energy ratio (ER) based approach [28] ; ii) self-contamination (SC) based approach [29] ; iii) two-way FIGURE 13. Probability of correct detection versus the spoofing power P E (training power P B = 5, number of Alice's antennas M = 4, and false alarm rate P fa = 0.001, Eve transmits random bits during random phase). FIGURE 14. ROC curves of spoofing detectors (training power P B = 5, spoofing power P E = 1, and number of Alice's antennas M = 4, Eve transmits random bits during random phase).
training (TWT) based approach [31] . All the schemes have similar training overheads and powers to assure the fairness of comparison. Obviously, our proposed spoofing detector significantly outperforms its competitors. Next, for the sake of enhanced experimental credibility and comparison results, in Fig. 14 we examine the ROC curves of spoofing detectors with the same parameter settings. Again, our proposed spoofing detector is superior to the competitors in all false alarm rate ranges.
In addition, we also evaluate the case when h B and h E are correlated. Fig. 15 shows the probability of correct detection P d versus the spoofing power P E under correlated channels with correlation coefficient ρ = 0.1. In this simulation, training power P B = 5, and number of Alice's antennas M = 4, and Eve sends random bits during random phase. It can be observed that our proposed detector still can effectively detect the pilot spoofing attack when h B and h E are correlated. In Fig. 16 , we further illustrate the performance of our detector under the situation where there exists multiple Eves and all of them transmits random bits during the random phase. It can be observed that the performance of our proposed spoofing detector under multi-Eve case is even better than Fig. 5 in which only one Eve launches the spoofing attack. The reason for this phenomenon is that multiple Eves result in larger spoofing power and consequently the probability of detection increases with the increase of spoofing power.
Next, we turn to evaluate the performance of the proposed channel estimation enhancement algorithm. In Fig. 17 we show mean square error (MSE), which is defined as
versus the number of pilot (random) bits N p . Three channel estimation methods are considered: i) Conventional channel estimation (CCE) as in (5) with N p pilot bits; ii) CCE with (N p + N r ) pilot bits which serves as the performance benchmark; iii) our proposed channel estimation enhancement (CEE) approach with N p pilot bits and N r random bits. Again, our CEE algorithm uses the same number of pilot bits and random bits N p = N r . As we can observe from Fig. 17 , our proposed CEE can significantly improve the performance comparing with using only N p pilot bits and approaches the performance benchmark. Now, we briefly discuss the complexity of our proposed algorithm and compare it with other three state-of-the-art algorithms. Notice that both ER and TWT algorithms exploit the difference of the factors (power/channel) estimated by uplink training and downlink training. Certainly, the training procedures by both uplink and downlink make these approaches more complicated in the practical implementation. Our proposed RTA spoofing detection algorithm needs solely uplink training and consequently has much less system complexity on training procedure than ER and TWT. The SC algorithm uses the information-theoretic MDL algorithm to detect the spoofing attack and needs only uplink training. However, the computational complexity of MDL algorithm is O(N 3 + M 3 ). In our proposed algorithm, the computational complexity of the core ILS algorithm is only O(ND), where D is the number of iterations in each ILS execution which is experimentally between 2 and 5 in general. Therefore, compared with other state-of-the-art spoofing attack detectors, our proposed RTA detector has the simplest training process and the lowest computational complexity.
Then we illustrate the performance of the proposed secure transmission algorithm. Fig. 18 shows the ergodic secrecy rate as a function of the transmission power P A . The training power is P B = 5dB, spoofing power is P E = 1dB, the number of Alice's antennas is M = 4, and the number of the pilot (random) bits is N p = N r = 64. In this simulation, we assume that Eve also transmits random bits during the random phase. The performance of the five downlink data transmission schemes are illustrated: i) Ordinary beamforming as in (6) without any PLS-based secure effort which serves as comparison benchmark; ii) generalized eigen-decomposition (GED)-based secure beamforming with true channel which serves as the performance benchmark; iii) GED-based secure beamforming with estimated channel; iv) our proposed ZF-based secure beamforming with true channel; v) our proposed ZF-based secure beamforming with estimated channel as in (59). We can conclude that our proposed ZF-based secure transmission algorithm can significantly improve the secrecy rate and achieve performance as good as the GED-based secure beamforming approach.
In Fig. 19 , we investigate the impact of three different strategies Eve may use in the random phase, which are: i) Eve transmits random bits; ii) Eve sends Gaussian noise; iii) Eve remains silent. The training power is P B = 5dB, spoofing power is P E = 1dB, the number of Alice's antennas is M = 4, and the number of the pilot (random) bits is N p = N r = 64. It shows that the security performance is the worst when Eve transmits random bits during the random phase, which verifies our prediction. However, even in the worst case for the legitimate users, the result illustrates that the secrecy rate is satisfactory and much higher than ordinary beamforming without any PLS effort.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of detecting pilot spoofing attack for a multi-input single-output (MISO) wiretap system. We proposed a novel random-trainingassisted (RTA) spoofing detection scheme which examines the difference of estimated legitimate channels during pilot phase and random phase. Then, for no spoofing case, a simple channel estimation enhancement algorithm was presented to further improve the accuracy of channel estimation. In case of the missed detection of the spoofing attack, we also proposed a secure transmission algorithm during downlink data transmission. Extensive simulation results illustrated that our proposed RTA scheme can achieve accurate pilot spoofing detection and its performance is superior to other state-ofthe-art detectors.
As a natural next step in future work, we will extend our studies to multiple Eves and multiple Bobs case, which is a quite common yet more challenging scenario. In addition, it is also worth investigating the optimization of the training lengths N p and N r for the two phases to achieve optimal spoofing detection performance.
APPENDIX PROOF OF (8), (12) AND (14)
We first give the proof of (12) and then prove (8) and (14) according to it. Given w = h B / h B , we formulate the average SNR at Bob when Eve launches the spoofing attack as 
We first focus on the derivation of the numerator of (62). Given
with n A ∼ N (0, 
The first term in (64) is P B α 2 B M 2 , the second term in (64) is
and the third term in (64) is 
Finally, the numerator of (62) becomes
Similarly, the dominator of (62) can be derived as
Applying (67) and (68) 
Equation (12) is proved.
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In order to prove (8), we let P E = 0 in (69), then we obtain the SNR B when Eve does not launch the spoofing attack as below
Equation (8) is proved. Similar to the proof of (12), we can obtain the proof of (14) by simply changing all the α B , σ B , P B , and P E in (69) into α E , σ E , P E , and P B , respectively. Then the SNR E when Eve launches the spoofing attack has the expression as below
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